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CLAIMING	NEUTRALITY	AND	CONFESSING	SUBJECTIVITY	IN	
SUPREME	COURT	CONFIRMATION	HEARINGS	
CAROLYN	SHAPIRO*	
Supreme	Court	justices	speak	directly	to	the	American	people	in	a	
variety	of	ways–through	their	opinions,	of	course,	and	through	books	
and	public	appearances.	But	for	many	Americans,	the	first	(and	possi‐
bly	the	only)	time	they	hear	from	a	Supreme	Court	justice	(or	would‐be	
justice)	is	when	he	or	she	testifies	during	his	or	her	confirmation	hear‐
ing.	Indeed,	thanks	to	the	ban	on	cameras	in	the	courtroom,	confirma‐
tion	hearings	provide	Americans	with	one	of	 their	only	 opportunities	
to	see	official	Court‐related	work	being	done.1	Nonetheless,	 there	has	
been	 very	 little	 systematic	 discussion	 of	what	Americans	 (or	 at	 least	
those	who	pay	reasonably	close	attention	to	the	hearings)2	hear	at	that	
time,	and	even	less	of	how	they	respond	to	what	they	hear.	This	paper	
undertakes	a	small	part	of	that	investigation,	focusing	narrowly	on	an	
empirical	 investigation	of	when	and	how	the	nominees	talk	about	the	
role	of	the	judge	and	the	courts,	especially	the	Supreme	Court,	and	on	
whether	 and	 how	 those	 discussions	 have	 changed	 over	 time.	 More	
*	Associate	Professor	 of	 Law	and	Director,	 Institute	 on	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	 the	United	 States
(ISCOTUS),	IIT	Chicago‐Kent	College	of	Law.	I	would	like	to	thank	Christopher	Schmidt	and	Jerry	
Thomas,	 as	well	 as	 participants	 in	 the	University	 of	 Chicago’s	 Judicial	 Behavior	Workshop	 and	
participants	of	a	Chicago‐Kent	 faculty	workshop	 for	 their	helpful	comments	and	suggestions	on	
this	paper	and	on	a	related	project.	I	would	particularly	like	to	thank	Lee	Epstein	for	pushing	me	
to	 consider	 the	 role	 of	 the	 filibuster.	 Research	 assistance,	 especially	 coding,	 was	 provided	 by	
Matthew	Zarobsky,	Danielle	Tinkoff,	Eun	Nam,	Catherine	Lee,	Ryan	Janski,	Luke	Harriman,	Emily	
Chase‐Sosnoff,	and	Rachel	Brady.		
1.	 One	other	televised	opportunity	to	see	Court‐related	business	is	the	justices’	annual	visit
to	 congressional	 appropriations	 committees	 to	 discuss	 the	 Court’s	 budget.	 As	 Jason	 Mazzone	
pointed	 out	 at	 the	 live	 Symposium	 at	 which	 this	 paper	 was	 presented,	 see	
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tfLNllcaank&feature=youtu.be,	 the	 testimony	and	 colloquies	
in	these	hearings	are	an	under‐studied	source	of	information.	Nonetheless,	relative	to	confirma‐
tion	hearings,	they	are	very	low‐profile	events.	Most	Americans	are	probably	completely	unaware	
that	they	even	occur.	
2.	 While	most	Americans	certainly	do	not	listen	to	or	watch	confirmation	hearings	gavel‐to‐
gavel,	the	public	 follows	Supreme	Court	nominations	and	confirmation	hearings	with	surprising	
attentiveness.	James	Gibson	and	Gregory	Caldeira	found,	for	example,	that	51.9%	of	their	survey	
respondents	followed	the	Alito	confirmation	process	“either	very	or	somewhat	closely”	and	only	
22.2%	said	that	“they	paid	relatively	little	attention	to	the	process.”	JAMES	L.	GIBSON	&	GREGORY	A.	
CALDEIRA,	 CITIZENS,	 COURTS,	 AND	 CONFIRMATIONS:	 POSITIVITY	 THEORY	 AND	 THE	 JUDGMENTS	 OF	 THE	
AMERICAN	PEOPLE	71	 (2009);	see	also	Geoffrey	R.	 Stone,	Understanding	Supreme	Court	Confirma‐
tions,	 2010	 SUP.	 CT.	 REV.	 381,	 449	 (2011)	 (describing	 intense	media	 coverage	 in	 contemporary	
confirmation	hearings).	
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specifically,	 I	examine	when	and	under	what	circumstances	nominees	
claim	or	suggest	that	judging	is	primarily	an	objective	or	neutral	exer‐
cise	 and	 when	 they	 acknowledge	 the	 inevitable	 role	 of	 subjective	
judgment.3	
This	question	 is	particularly	 timely.	 In	 the	 four	most	 recent	 con‐
firmation	 hearings,	 those	 for	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts	 and	 Justices	 Alito,	
Sotomayor,	 and	 Kagan,	 nominees	 and	 senators	 alike	 frequently	 de‐
scribed	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Court	 as	 objective	 and	 neutral.	 Perhaps	 the	
most	famous	such	statement	in	recent	hearings	is	then‐Judge	Roberts’	
claim	that	the	judge–or	justice–is	no	more	than	an	“umpire,”	whose	job	
is	to	“call	balls	and	strikes.”4	But	Roberts	is	not	alone.	Then‐Judge	So‐
tomayor	rejected	President	Obama’s	call	for	“empathy”	in	judging,	ex‐
plaining	 that	 judges	 “apply	 law	 to	 facts.	 We	 don’t	 apply	 feelings	 to	
facts.”5	 Certain	 phrases	 crop	 up	 repeatedly	 in	 these	 discussions:	 it	 is	
the	justice’s	role	to	“follow	the	law”	or	“apply	the	law”	but	not	to	“make	
3. 	There	is	no	question	that	some	forms	of	neutrality	are	essential	to	the	judicial	role.	We
certainly	expect	judges	not	to	allow	any	personal	feelings	about	the	parties	to	affect	their	rulings,	
for	example.	The	Nomination	of	Elena	Kagan	to	be	an	Associate	Justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	
United	 States	Before	 the	 S.	Comm.	on	 the	 Judiciary,	 111th	 Cong.	 202	 (2010)	 (response	 of	 Elena	
Kagan	 to	 Sen.	Amy	Klobuchar,	 S.	 Comm.	on	 the	 Judiciary)	 (making	 this	point);	 see	also	 Carolyn	
Shapiro,	The	Language	of	Neutrality	 in	Supreme	Court	Confirmation	Hearings	(work	in	progress)	
(on	file	with	the	author)	(discussing	different	types	of	neutrality).	Moreover,	by	saying	that	there	
is	an	inevitable	role	for	subjective	judgment,	I	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	judges	operate	solely	on	
the	 basis	 of	 subjective	 judgment	 or	 that	 law	 has	 no	 role	 in	 their	 deliberations.	 See	 Carolyn	
Shapiro,	The	Context	of	Ideology:	Law,	Politics,	and	Empirical	Legal	Scholarship,	75	MISSOURI	L.	REV.
79,	126‐28	(2010)	(hereinafter,	Shapiro,	Context).	In	fact,	law	often	explicitly	requires	subjective	
judgment.	RICHARD	A.	POSNER,	HOW	JUDGES	THINK	9	(2008).		
4. Confirmation	Hearing	on	the	Nomination	of	Hon.	John	G.	Roberts,	Jr.	to	be	Chief	Justice	of
the	United	States	Before	the	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary,	109th	Cong.	55‐56	(2005)	(statement	of	J.	
John	G.	Roberts).	
5. Confirmation	 Hearing	 on	 the	 Nomination	 of	 Hon.	 Sonia	 Sotomayor	 to	 be	 an	 Associate
Justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	States	Before	the	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary,	111th	Cong.	
121	(2009)	(response	of	J.	Sonia	Sotomayor	to	Sen.	Jon	Kyl,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
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the	 law.”6	 “Activist”	 judging	 is	 disavowed	 as	 illegitimate.7	 Ideology	 is	
emphatically	rejected	as	having	any	legitimate	role	in	what	judges	do.8	
This	version	of	the	work	of	a	Supreme	Court	justice	is	inaccurate	
at	best.9	Many	of	the	questions	that	judges	decide	do	not	have	simple,	
logically	deducible	resolutions.	This	feature	of	judicial	decision‐making	
is	 particularly	 salient	 in	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 both	 because	 cases	with	
easy	answers	are	less	likely	to	be	appealed	than	harder	cases	and	are	
much,	much	 less	 likely	to	be	reviewed	by	the	Supreme	Court,	and	be‐
cause	district	and	circuit	court	judges	are	bound	by	precedent	in	a	way	
that	the	Supreme	Court	is	not.10	As	a	result,	the	justices	can	and	must	
exercise	 subjective	 judgment,	 which	 inevitably	 involves	 political	 or	
ideological	judgment,	in	deciding	many	cases.11	
This	feature	of	Supreme	Court	judging	is	well‐known	to	the	partic‐
ipants	in	the	nomination	and	confirmation	process.	Both	conventional	
wisdom	 and	 empirical	 studies	 illustrate	 that	 ideology	 “affect[s]	 who	
the	President	will	 nominate	 and	whether	 the	 Senate	will	 confirm	his	
choice,”12	and	ideology	appears	to	have	become	increasingly	important	
6. See,	e.g.,	Confirmation	Hearing,	Roberts,	supra	note	4,	at	8	(statement	of	Sen.	Orrin	Hatch,
S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary);	id.	at	162,	(response	of	J.	John	G.	Roberts	to	Sen.	Orrin	Hatch,	S.	Comm.	
on	 the	 Judiciary)	 (promising	 to	 “interpret,”	 and	 not	 “make”	 law);	 Confirmation	Hearing	 on	 the	
Nomination	of	Hon.	Samuel	A.	Alito,	Jr.	to	be	an	Associate	Justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	the	United	
States	Before	 the	S.	Comm.	on	 the	 Judiciary,	 109th	Cong.	378	 (2006)	 (statement	of	 Sen.	Herbert	
Kohl,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary);	supra	note	5,	at	6	(statement	of	Sen.	Jeff	Sessions,	S.	Comm.	on	
the	Judiciary	);	id.	at	70	(statement	of	J.	Sonia	Sotomayor	)	(“[J]udges	must	apply	the	law	and	not	
make	the	law.”);	Confirmation	Hearing,	Kagan,	supra	note	3,	at	220	(response	of	Elena	Kagan	to	
Sen.	Al	Franken,	S.	Comm.	on	the	 Judiciary)	(noting	 that	Congress	makes	 the	 law	and	the	Court	
must	apply	the	law).	
7. See,	 e.g.,	 Confirmation	 Hearing,	 Sotomayor,	 supra	 note	 5,	 at	 6	 (statement	 of	 Sen.	 Jeff
Sessions,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary);	id.	at	24	(statement	of	Sen.	Jon	Kyl,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judici‐
ary).	
8. See,	e.g.,	Confirmation	Hearing,	Roberts,	supra	note	4,	at	256	(response	of	J.	John	G.	Rob‐
erts	to	Sen.	Lindsey	Graham,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
9.	 The	judge‐as‐umpire	metaphor	and	disavowal	of	a	role	for	empathy	in	judging	have	been
extensively	criticized.	See,	e.g.,	Neil	S.	Siegel,	Umpires	at	Bat:	On	Integration	and	Legitimation,	24	
CONST.	COMMENTARY	701	(2007);	Thomas	B.	Colby,	In	Defense	of	Judicial	Empathy,	96	MINN.	L.	REV.
1946	(2012);	Susan	A.	Bandes,	Moral	Imagination	in	Judging,	51	WASHBURN	L.J.	1	(2011);	Michael	
J.	Gerhardt,	Constitutional	Branding,	40	HOFSTRA	L.	REV.	655	(2012).	
10.	 	See	POSNER,	supra	note	3,	at	144,	151,	275.	District	court	judges	have	tremendous	discre‐
tion	over	many	rulings,	but	those	rulings	tend	to	be	case‐	and	fact‐specific.	
11.	 	Take,	for	example,	Parents	Involved	in	Community	Schools	v.	Seattle	School	District	No.	1,
551	U.S.	701	(2007).	The	issue	in	that	case	was	whether	a	public	school	district	could	rely	on	race	
when	 assigning	 students	 to	 schools	 in	 an	 effort	 to	maintain	 racial	 integration.	 “Although	 there	
were	legal	arguments	to	be	made,	the	key	textual	sources	–	both	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education	and	
the	Constitution	itself	–	failed	to	explicitly	[or	objectively]	dictate	a	result.	Ultimately,	 therefore,	
the	outcome	was	determined	by	the	Justices’	political	 judgments,	 informed	by	their	value‐laden	
understanding	of	 the	meaning	of	Brown.”	Shapiro,	Context,	 supra	 note	3,	 at	127	 (citing	Christo‐
pher	W.	Schmidt,	Brown	and	the	Colorblind	Cosntitution,	94	CORNELL	L.	REV.	203	(2008)).	
12.	 Lee	Epstein,	Jeffrey	A.	Segal	&	Chad	Westerland,	The	Increasing	Importance	of	Ideology	in
the	Nomination	and	Confirmation	of	Supreme	Court	Justices,	56	DRAKE	L.	REV.	609,	610	(2008);	see	
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over	time.13	Nor	is	it	a	secret	from	the	American	public.	When	the	cur‐
rent	 Supreme	 Court	 actually	 decides	 cases,	 many	 of	 those	 cases	 are	
decided	by	narrow	votes,	with	four	“conservative”	justices	on	one	side,	
four	 “liberal”	 justices	 on	 the	 other,	 and	 with	 Justice	 Kennedy	 as	 the	
swing	vote.14	Such	cases	tend	to	be	among	the	most	high	profile	on	the	
Court’s	docket,15	and	media	reports	often	describe	the	voting	blocs	on	
the	Court	and	individual	 justices	as	 liberal	or	conservative.16	There	is	
thus	a	significant	disconnect	between	many	of	the	claims	of	neutrality	
made	 about	 judging	 during	 confirmation	 hearings	 and	much	 of	what	
the	public	sees	once	the	new	justice	takes	his	or	her	seat	on	the	Court.	
In	this	paper,	 I	examine	part	of	that	disconnect.	Specifically,	 I	ex‐
plore	 what	 nominees	 say	 about	 judging	 during	 their	 confirmation	
also	 Stone,	 supra	 note	2,	 at	392	 (noting	 that	 “[H]istorically,	 then,	 a	nominee’s	views	have	often	
played	an	important	role	in	the	confirmation	process”	and	that	“senators	tend	to	vote	with	at	least	
one	eye	on	ideology”);	id.	at	393	(demonstrating	that	senators	are	much	more	likely	to	vote	for	a	
nominee	with	whom	they	are	ideologically	aligned).	
13.	 Epstein,	Segal	&	Westerland,	supra	note	12,	at	610;	see	also	Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	446‐47	
(noting	that	ideology	has	become	most	important	in	the	four	most	recent	confirmation	hearings).	
14.	 In	October	Term	2011,	which	ended	in	June	2012,	there	were	fifteen	cases	decided	by	a
5‐4	vote.	Ten	of	those	cases	have	this	liberal/conservative	split.	SCOTUSBLOG	STAT	PACK	–	Final	–	
October	 Term	 2011,	 (June	 30,	 2012),	 http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp‐
content/uploads/2012/06/SB_five‐to‐four_OT11_final.pdf.	 Of	 course,	 Justice	 Kennedy	 is	 not	
always	the	swing	vote.	A	notable	and	surprising	recent	instance	in	which	he	was	not	is	National	
Federation	of	Independent	Business	v.	Sebelius,	132	S.	Ct.	2566	(2012),	the	remarkably	high‐profile	
challenge	 to	 the	 Patient	 Protection	 and	Affordable	 Care	 Act.	 In	 that	 case,	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts	
provided	 the	 fifth	 vote,	 along	with	 the	 four	 liberals,	 to	 uphold	 the	 law.	 Justice	 Kennedy	 joined	
Justices	Alito,	Scalia,	and	Thomas	in	dissent.	See	also	Benjamin	E.	Lauderdale	&	Tom.	S.	Clark,	The	
Supreme	Court’s	Many	Median	Justices,	106	AM.	POL.	SCI.	REV.	847,	847‐48	(2012)	(explaining	that	
Justice	Kennedy	is	not	reliably	the	median	justice).	The	votes	in	National	Federation	of	Independ‐
ent	Business,	however,	were	widely	seen	as	highly	ideological.	
15.	 Pamela	S.	Karlan,	The	Supreme	Court–2011	Term–Foreword:	Democracy	and	Disdain,	126	
HARV.	L.	REV.	1,	6	(2012)	(explaining	that	on	the	current	Court,	the	divide	on	“the	issues	of	greatest	
public	concern”	is	not	only	ideological,	but	also	partisan).	
16.	 See,	e.g.,	Robert	Barnes	&	N.C.	Aizenman,	Supreme	Court	Expresses	Doubt	About	Key	Issue
in	Health‐Care	Law,	WASH.	POST.	(March	27,	2012),		
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme‐court‐considers‐main‐constitutional‐
question‐in‐health‐care‐law/2012/03/26/gIQAkyKWdS_story.html	 (describing	 reactions	 and	
questioning	of	“conservative”	and	“liberal”	justices	during	the	oral	arguments	in	National	Federa‐
tion	 of	 Independent	Business,	 132	 S.	 Ct.	 2566	 (2012));	 Sheryl	 Gay	 Stolberg,	 Future	 of	 an	Aging	
Court	 Raises	 Stakes	 in	 Presidential	 Vote,	 N.Y.	 TIMES	 (June	 27,	 2012),	
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us/presidential‐election‐could‐reshape‐an‐aging‐
supreme‐court.html	(discussing	current	and	historical	justices	and	the	timing	of	their	retirements	
in	ideological	terms);	David	G.	Savage,	Supreme	Court	Voting	Blocs	Set	in	Stone,	L.A.	TIMES	(June	29,	
2008),	 http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/29/nation/na‐scotus29	 (assessing	 October	 Term	
2007	by	discussing	in	which	cases	the	conservative	bloc	prevailed	and	in	which	the	liberals	won).	
There	are,	of	course,	a	substantial	number	of	cases	that	evidence	non‐ideological	voting,	whether	
because	 they	 are	 unanimous	 or	 because	 the	 voting	 patterns	 are	 less	 predictable.	 See	 Paul	 H.	
Edelman,	David	E.	Klein	&	Stefanie	A.	Lindquist,	Measuring	Deviations	 from	Expected	Voting	Pat‐
terns	on	Collegial	Courts,	5	J.	OF	EMPIRICAL	LEG.	STUD.	819	(2008);	Paul	H.	Edelman,	David	E.	Klein	&	
Stefanie	A.	Lindquist,	Consensus,	Disorder,	and	Ideology	on	the	Supreme	Court,	9	J.	OF	EMPIRICAL	LEG.
STUD.	129	(2012).	
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hearings	 and	 consider	 how	 those	 statements	might	 affect	Americans’	
view	of	the	Court	as	an	institution.	Ultimately,	I	consider	whether	and	
how	those	statements—in	particular	the	disparity	between	ubiquitous	
claims	 of	 neutrality	 and	 objectivity	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	 rarer	
acknowledgements	of	 the	role	 for	subjective	 judgment	on	the	other	–
might	affect	the	legitimacy	of	the	Court.	
The	paper	proceeds	in	three	parts.	In	Part	I,	I	provide	some	back‐
ground	 on	 Supreme	 Court	 confirmation	 hearings	 and	 nominations,17	
on	some	of	the	empirical	research	that	has	already	been	done,	and	on	
the	reasons	that	the	particular	question	I	pursue	here	is	important.	In	
Part	 II,	 I	 describe	my	 empirical	 investigation	 into	 nominee	 claims	 of	
neutrality	 and	 admissions	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 I	 present	 my	 findings.	
Finally,	in	Part	III,	I	discuss	some	of	the	implications	of	these	findings.	
Most	specifically,	I	rely	on	a	burgeoning	literature	on	cultural	cognition	
and	law	to	explore	possible	consequences	and	implications	of	the	dis‐
connect	 between	 the	 confirmation	 hearing	 rhetoric	 of	 objectivity	 or	
neutrality	 and	 the	 reality	 of	 Supreme	 Court	 judging.	 The	 paper	 con‐
cludes	by	suggesting	directions	for	future	research.	
I.	SUPREME	COURT	CONFIRMATION	HEARINGS:	HISTORY	AND	RHETORIC	
A.	Background	
Supreme	Court	confirmation	hearings	and	nominees’	appearances	
at	 them	are	newer	than	many	assume.18	Until	1916,	 the	Senate	voted	
on	 Supreme	 Court	 nominations	 without	 any	 public	 hearings	 at	 all.19	
Even	after	hearings	began	to	be	held,	no	nominee	testified	before	the	
Judiciary	 Committee	 until	 Harlan	 Fiske	 Stone	 in	 1925.20	 And	 after	
17.	 Throughout	this	Article,	I	rely	on	background	data	collected	and	made	publicly	available
by	 Lee	 Epstein,	 et	 al.,	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 Justices	 Database,	 available	 at	
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/justicesdata.html.	 This	 database	 contains	 an	
enormous	 amount	 of	 information	 about	 every	 individual	 nominated	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	
(through	Justice	Sotomayor),	whether	or	not	that	individual	was	ultimately	confirmed.	
18.	 That	 there	 were	 no	 hearings	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 Senate	 automatically	 confirmed
whoever	the	President	nominated.	To	the	contrary,	“from	1790	to	1900,	the	Senate	confirmed	69	
percent	of	all	nominees	.	.	.	.	 “	Stone¸	 supra	note	2,	at	382.	From	1900	 through	1955,	 the	Senate	
confirmed	92	percent	of	nominees,	and	since	1955,	it	has	confirmed	77	percent.	Id.	at	383.	Note,	
however,	that	a	number	of	the	nominees	who	were	not	confirmed–in	both	time	periods–also	were	
not	voted	down.	Either	the	Congress	ended	without	a	vote	or	the	nomination	was	withdrawn.	Id.	
at	 382.	 An	 examination	 of	 only	 those	 nominations	 that	 the	 Senate	 actually	 voted	 on,	 however,	
reveals	the	same	pattern.	Id.	at	384.	
19.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	426.	
20.	 Harlan	Stone	appeared	“at	the	request	of	President	Calvin	Coolidge”	in	order	to	“defend[]	
himself	against	charges”	related	to	the	Teapot	Dome	scandal.	Lori	A.	Ringhand	&	Paul	M.	Collins,	
Jr.,	May	 It	Please	the	Senate:	An	Empirical	Analysis	of	the	Senate	 Judiciary	Committee	Hearings	of	
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Stone’s	 testimony,	such	appearances	remained	extremely	rare	 for	 the	
next	thirty	years.	
Since	 1955,	 however,	 an	 appearance	 before	 the	 Senate	 Judiciary	
Committee	 has	 been	 expected	 of	 every	 nominee,21	 and	 since	 1955	 a	
total	 of	 thirty	 Supreme	 Court	 confirmation	 hearings,	 for	 thirty	 nomi‐
nees,	have	been	held.	Ten	of	these	nominees	were	nominated	by	Dem‐
ocratic	 presidents	 and	 twenty	 by	Republican	presidents.22	Out	 of	 the	
thirty	 nominees	 who	 testified,	 only	 five	 were	 not	 confirmed.23	 Alt‐
hough	Republican	presidents	have	made	twice	as	many	nominations	as	
Democratic	presidents,	almost	all	of	 the	nominations,	by	either	party,	
were	considered	by	a	Senate	under	Democratic	control.	All	 ten	of	 the	
Democratic	 nominees	 were	 made	 to	 Democratic‐controlled	 Senates,	
and	 only	 five	 Republican	 nominees	 were	made	 to	 a	 Republican	 Sen‐
ate.24	
Not	 all	 confirmation	 hearings	 are	 the	 same.	 Historically,	 some	
nominees	were	asked	virtually	no	questions.	Justice	Whittaker’s	public	
testimony	 at	 his	 1957	 confirmation	 hearing	 takes	 up	 precisely	 three	
pages	 of	 transcript.25	 Even	 some	 of	 the	 more	 controversial	 nomina‐
tions,	 such	 as	 President	 Johnson’s	 nomination	 of	 Thurgood	Marshall,	
featured	only	a	 relatively	small	number	of	 senators	asking	questions.	
Marshall	was	 interrogated	at	 length,	but	primarily	by	only	 four	sena‐
tors–three	of	them	Southern	Democrats	and	all	of	them	ardent	segre‐
gationists.26	 Beginning	 in	 1981,	 however,	 with	 Justice	 O’Connor’s	
Supreme	Court	Nominees,	1939‐2009,	60	AM.	U.	L.	REV.	589,	594	(2011)	(citing	History	of	the	Senate	
Committee	 on	 the	 Judiciary,	 U.S.	 SENATE	 COMM.	 ON	 THE	 JUDICIARY,	
http://judiciary.senate.gove/about/history/index.cfm).	 “In	 1939,	 Felix	 Frankfurter	 became	 the	
first	nominee	to	take	unrestricted	questions	in	an	open,	transcribed	public	hearing.”	Id.		
21.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	427.	
22.	 Two	 individuals	 appeared	 twice:	 Rehnquist	 and	 Fortas	 each	 appeared	 both	 when	 ap‐
pointed	to	be	an	Associate	Justice	and	later	when	nominated	for	Chief	Justice.	I	have	counted	each	
nomination	separately.	
23. The	failed	nominations	were	Fortas	in	his	bid	to	be	Chief	Justice,	Thornberry,	who	was
being	nominated	 for	Fortas’	Associate	 Justice	spot,	Haynsworth,	Carswell,	and	Bork.	There	have	
also	 been	 a	 few	 failed	 nominations—notably	 Douglas	 Ginsburg	 and	 Harriet	 Miers—where	 the	
nomination	was	withdrawn	before	a	hearing	could	be	held.	These	nominations	are	not	considered	
in	this	Article.	
24. These	 nominees	 were	 O’Connor,	 Scalia,	 Rehnquist,	 when	 nominated	 for	 Chief	 Justice,	
Roberts,	and	Alito.	Note,	then,	that	we	have	no	examples	of	Democratic	nominees	being	nominat‐
ed	to	a	Republican	Senate.	See	Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	386.	
25.	 Nomination	 of	 Charles	 E.	Whittaker,	 of	Missouri,	 to	 be	Associate	 Justice	 of	 the	 Supreme
Court	of	the	United	States	Before	the	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary,	85th	Cong.	32‐34	(1957).	At	the	end	
of	the	public	testimony,	the	committee	went	into	executive	session.	Id.	at	34.	
26.	 Nomination	of	Thurgood	Marshall,	of	New	York,	to	be	an	Associate	Justice	of	the	Supreme
Court	of	 the	United	States	Before	 the	S.	Comm.	on	 the	 Judiciary,	 90th	Cong.	1‐27,	48‐74,	86‐100,	
155‐80,	187‐98	(1967)	(questioning	by	Senators	James	O.	Eastland,	John	J.	McClellan,	and	Sam	J.	
Ervin,	all	Democrats,	as	well	as	by	Strom	Thurmond,	who	was,	by	then,	a	Republican).		
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hearing,	 almost	 every	 committee	member	has	 asked	questions	of	 the	
nominee.27	 (Probably	 not	 coincidentally,	 Justice	 O’Connor’s	 hearing	
was	the	 first	 to	be	 televised.28)	And	since	 Justice	Souter’s	nomination	
in	1990,	every	senator	on	the	committee	has	taken	a	turn–or	several–
asking	questions	of	every	nominee.29	
It	 is	 conventional	 wisdom	 that	 the	 failed	 nomination	 of	 Robert	
Bork	 in	 1987	 marked	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 confirmation	 hearings,	 alt‐
hough	the	conventional	wisdom	is	not	always	consistent	on	the	nature	
of	 the	 change.	After	Bork,	 some	argue,	 confirmation	hearings	became	
highly	partisan	 “vicious	 fights,”	 rife	with	 inappropriate	demands	 that	
nominees	declare	 their	position	on	 issues.30	On	the	other	hand,	some	
complain	that	post‐Bork,	senators	do	not	insist	on	serious	discussions	
of	“a	nominee’s	legal	views”	on	important	issues,31	and	some	likewise	
argue	that	because	Bork	was	particularly	candid	in	discussing	his	(rel‐
atively	extreme)	views	about	 the	 law,	and	because	 that	candor	 led	 to	
his	 defeat,	 subsequent	 nominees	 have	 become	 increasingly	 less	 can‐
did.32	
Recent	empirical	research	complicates	these	claims.	In	one	study,	
Lori	 Ringhand	 and	 Paul	 Collins	 found	 that	 nominees	 have	 long	 been	
asked	substantive	questions	about	legal	matters,	especially	civil	rights,	
and	judicial	philosophy.33	At	the	same	time,	they	found	that	there	has	
been	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 proportion	 of	 substantive	questions	 asked	 at	
confirmation	hearings,	but	they	date	the	beginning	of	that	trend	to	the	
27.	 Beginning	 with	 Justice	 O’Connor’s	 hearing,	 every	 Republican	 on	 the	 committee	 asked
questions.	 Senator	 Byrd,	 a	 Democrat,	 declined	 to	 ask	 questions	 of	 O’Connor,	 Scalia,	 and	 of	
Rehnquist	at	his	Chief	Justice	hearing.	Senator	Simon,	also	a	Democrat,	did	not	ask	Kennedy	any	
questions.	All	senators	had	questions	for	Robert	Bork.	
28.	 Ringhand	&	Collins,	supra	note	20,	at	601	(citing	Michael	Comiskey,	Not	Guilty:	The	News
Media	in	the	Supreme	Court	Confirmation	Process,	15	J.L.	&	POL.	1,	29	(1999)).	
29.	 This	information	was	generated	through	the	coding	project	described	in	Part	II.	Televis‐
ing	 the	hearings	of	 course	provides	senators	a	chance	 to	perform	 for	 their	constituents	and	 for	
various	interest	groups.	Comiskey,	supra	note	28at	28	(citing	TWENTIETH	CENTURY	FUND	TASK	FORCE
ON	 JUDICIAL	 SELECTION,	 JUDICIAL	ROULETTE:	REPORT	OF	 THE	TWENTIETH	CENTURY	 FUND	TASK	 FORCE	 ON	
JUDICIAL	 SELECTION	 9‐10	 (1988)	 (discussing	 increased	 senatorial	 attention	 to	 the	 hearings	 after	
they	 began	 being	 broadcast	 on	 television));	 Stone,	 supra,	 note	 2,	 at	 450‐52	 (discussing	 the	 in‐
creasing	 importance	 of	 interest	 groups	 in	 the	 confirmation	 process	 and	 noting	 that	 a	 “senator	
who	ignores	these	groups	does	so	at	his	peril.”).		
30.	 	STEPHEN	 L.	 CARTER,	 THE	 CONFIRMATION	 MESS:	 CLEANING	 UP	 THE	 FEDERAL	 APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS	x‐xi,	10‐11	(1994)	
31.	 	Elena	Kagan,	Confirmation	Messes	Old	and	New,	62	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	919,	920	(1995).	
32.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	434‐36,	436	fig.	34.	
33.	 Ringhand	 &	 Collins,	 supra	note	 20,	 at	 598‐99.	 This	 finding	 is	 consistent	with	my	 own	
review	of	hearing	transcripts.	Some	nominees,	however,	were	asked	virtually	no	such	questions,	
while	today	such	a	situation	would	be	unthinkable.	
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early	 1970s34–years	 before	 Bork’s	 1987	 nomination.	 Moreover,	 they	
date	 the	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 total	number	of	questions	 in	each	
hearing	asked	to	Rehnquist’s	1986	hearings	to	become	Chief	Justice.35	
In	 another	 set	 of	 studies,	 Dion	 Farganis	 and	 Justin	 Wedeking	
found	 that	post‐Bork,	 there	was	only	a	modest	 change	 in	 the	willing‐
ness	of	nominees	to	respond	forthrightly	to	questions	about	civil	rights	
and	 civil	 liberties–what	 they	 call	 “candor.”	 36	 Interestingly,	 Kennedy	
(along	with	Bork)	“took	the	level	of	forthrightness	to	a	new	high,”	fol‐
lowed	by	a	gradual	decline.37	More	recently,	however,	nominees	have	
become	significantly	less	candid:	“the	post‐2000	level	of	candor	dipped	
appreciably	below	the	pre‐Bork	level.”38	
Wedeking	 and	 Farganis	 also	 note	 that	 because	 there	 are	 now	
more	 questions	 and	 “tougher”	 questions	 asked	 in	 each	 confirmation	
hearing	than	there	used	to	be,	the	public	also	sees	nominees	refuse	to	
answer	more	questions.39	Thus,	even	if	nominees	are	not	significantly	
less	candid	than	they	used	to	be	when	measured	by	the	proportion	of	
questions	 they	 answer,	 because	 the	 absolute	 number	 of	 refusals	 has	
increased,	observers	may	experience	 the	nominees	as	being	 less	can‐
did.	Overall,	however,	as	Geoffrey	Stone	puts	it	in	his	study	of	the	con‐
firmation	 process,	 “Bork’s	 candor	.	.	.	 marked,	 not	 a	 critical	 turning	
point	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 confirmation	 process,	 but	 an	 aberra‐
tion	.	.	.	.”40	
Both	the	Ringhand/Collins	work	and	the	Farganis/Wedeking	stud‐
ies	add	valuable	information	about	the	content	of	Supreme	Court	con‐
firmation	hearings.	But	while	 their	 investigations	help	 to	 clarify	both	
34.	 Id.	at	603,	604	fig.	2.	
35.	 Id.	at	598.	
36.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	434	(citing	Dion	Farganis	&	Justin	Wedeking,	No	Hints,	No	Fore‐
casts,	 No	 Previews:	 Analyzing	 Supreme	 Court	 Nominee	 Evasiveness,	 1955‐2009	 at	 2	 (June	 22,	
2010)	(unpublished	manuscript),	available	at		
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628813	 (hereinafter,	 No	 Hints	 I);	 Dion	
Farganis	&	Justin	Wedeking,	Kagan’s	Candor:	Updated	Findings	from	the	Recent	Supreme	Court	
Confirmation	 Hearings	 (July	 6,	 2010)	 (unpublished	 manuscript),	 available	 at	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1635240	 (hereinafter	 Kagan’s	 Candor)).	
Farganis	 and	Wedeking	 have	 since	 combined	 these	 two	 articles	 into	 a	 single	 publication:	 Dion	
Farganis	&	 Justin	Wedeking,	 “No	Hints,	No	Forecasts,	No	Previews”:	An	Empirical	Analysis	of	Su‐
preme	Court	Nominee	Candor	from	Harlan	to	Kagan,	45	L.	&	SOCIETY	REV.	525	(2011)	(hereinafter	
No	Hints	II).	
37.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	434	(citing	Farganis	&	Wedeking,	No	Hints	I,	supra	note	36,	at	2;	
Kagan’s	Candor,	supra	note	36).	
38.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	434	(citing	Farganis	&	Wedeking,	No	Hints	I,	supra	note	36,	at	2;	
Kagan’s	Candor,	supra	note	36).	
39.	 Farganis	&	Wedeking,	No	Hints	II,	supra	note	36,	at	551‐52.	
40.	 Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	435.	
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that	 confirmation	 hearings	 have	 long	 included	 discussions	 of	 im‐
portant	 subjects	 and	 that	 nominees	 have	 always	 declined	 to	 answer	
some	of	the	senators’	questions,	the	studies	do	not	attempt	to	tease	out	
the	substance	of	what	the	nominees	actually	say	 in	those	discussions,	
particularly	about	the	nature	of	judging.	This	article	turns	the	focus	to	
that	question.	
B.	The	Recent	Hearings	
The	 question	 of	 how	 nominees	 describe	 the	 role	 of	 the	 judge	 is	
particularly	 salient	 in	 light	 of	 claims	 made	 by	 the	 four	 most	 recent	
nominees	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court:	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts,	 and	 Justices	
Alito,	 Sotomayor,	 and	 Kagan.	 Many	 cases	 decided	 by	 the	 Supreme	
Court	 involve	 difficult	 questions	 to	which	 there	 are	 not	 objective	 an‐
swers.41	Despite	 this	 reality,	 in	 these	most	 recent	 confirmation	hear‐
ings,	the	nominees	have,	at	least	sometimes,	described	their	approach	
to	 judging	 as	 if	 by	 looking	 closely	 at	 case	 facts	 and	 legal	materials,	 a	
logically	deducible–objective,	neutral–resolution	would	emerge.	Justice	
Sotomayor,	 for	 example,	 explained	 repeatedly	 that	 judging	 involves	
looking	closely	at	the	facts,	looking	closely	at	the	relevant	legal	materi‐
als	and	drawing	a	logical	conclusion	from	those	sources:	
I	don’t	judge	on	the	basis	of	ideology.	I	judge	on	the	basis	of	law	and	
my	reasoning	.	.	.	.	When	my	colleagues	and	I	 [on	the	Circuit	Court],	
in	 many	 cases,	 have	 initially	 come	 to	 disagreeing	 positions,	 we’ve	
discussed	them	and	either	persuaded	each	other,	changed	each	oth‐
er’s	minds,	and	worked	 from	the	starting	point	of	arguing,	discuss‐
ing,	exchanging	perspectives	on	what	the	law	commands.42	
Justice	 Alito,	 like	 most	 nominees,	 repeatedly	 described	 the	 im‐
portance	of	judicial	restraint	and	the	need	for	judges	to	guard	against	
injecting	their	personal	views	into	their	work.	In	describing	how	judg‐
es	might	do	this,	he	emphasized	the	importance	of	“objective”	sources	
of	information:	
[J]udges	have	to	look	to	objective	things,	and	if	it’s	a	question	of	ab‐
solutely	first	impression	.	.	.	you	would	look	to	the	text	of	the	Consti‐
tution	and	you	would	look	to	anything	that	would	shed	light	on	the	
way	in	which	the	provision	would	have	been	understood	by	people	
reading	it	at	the	time.	
41. 	It	 is	 in	 part	 for	 this	 reason,	 Judge	 Posner	 calls	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 a	 “political	 court.”
Posner,	supra	note	3,	at	272.	See	also	Shapiro,	Context,	supra	note	3,	at	126‐27	(listing	examples	of	
Supreme	Court	cases	involving	questions	without	“objectively	correct	answer[s]”);	supra	note	11	
(discussing	Parents	Involved);	supra	notes	10‐11	and	accompanying	text.	
42.	 See	 Confirmation	 Hearing,	 Sotomayor,	 supra	 note	 5,	 at	 437	 (response	 of	 J.	 Sonia	 So‐
tomayor	to	Sen.	Arlen	Specter,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
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You	certainly	would	look	to	precedent,	which	is	an	objective	factor,	
and	most	of	 the	 issues	 that	 come	up	 in	 constitutional	 law	now	 fall	
within	an	area	in	which	there	is	a	rich	and	often	very	complex	body	
of	doctrine	 that	has	worked	out.	 Search	and	seizure	 is	an	example.	
Most	of	the	issues	that	arise	concerning	freedom	of	speech	is	anoth‐
er	example.	There	is	a	whole	body	of	doctrine	dealing	with	that,	and	
that’s	objective	and	you	would	look	to	that	and	you	would	reason	by	
analogy	from	the	precedents	that	are	in	existence.43	
Most	 famously,	 when	 Chief	 Justice	 Roberts	 made	 claims	 of	 con‐
straint	and	objectivity	at	his	confirmation	hearing,	he	returned	repeat‐
edly	 to	 his	 umpire	 metaphor,	 and	 like	 the	 other	 three	 post‐2000	
nominees,	he	also	invoked	the	legal	sources	he	claimed	he	would	rely	
on	exclusively:	
We	 don’t	 turn	 a	matter	 over	 to	 a	 judge	 because	we	want	 his	 view	
about	what	the	best	idea	is,	what	the	best	solution	is.	It’s	because	we	
want	him	or	her	to	apply	the	law.	They	are	constrained	when	they	do	
that.	They	are	constrained	by	the	words	that	you	choose	to	enact	in‐
to	law	in	interpreting	the	law.	They	are	constrained	by	the	words	of	
the	 Constitution.	 They	 are	 constrained	 by	 the	 precedents	 of	 other	
judges	that	become	part	of	the	rule	of	law	that	they	must	apply.44	
Justice	 Kagan’s	 description	 of	 the	 judicial	 process	 was	 the	most	
complex	of	 the	 four.	On	 the	one	hand,	she	repeatedly	returned	 to	 the	
expression	 “it’s	 law	 all	 the	 way	 down”45	 to	 describe	 the	 proper	 ap‐
proach	 to	 judicial	 decision‐making,	 implying	 that	 the	 law	 alone	 can	
provide	the	answers	to	the	questions	put	to	the	Supreme	Court.	On	the	
other	hand,	she	did	acknowledge	 that	 there	are	sometimes	clashes	of	
constitutional	 provisions	 that	may	 require	 “judgment”	 and	 “wisdom”	
to	resolve:	
[J]udges	do	in	many	of	these	cases	have	to	exercise	judgment.	They	
are	not	easy	calls.	That	does	not	mean	that	they	are	doing	anything	
other	than	applying	the	law.	I	said	yesterday	on	a	couple	of	different	
occasions	 it	 is	 law	all	 the	way	down.	You	know,	you	are	 looking	at	
the	text,	you	are	looking	at	structure,	you	are	looking	at	history,	you	
are	looking	at	precedent.	You	are	looking	at	law	and	only	at	law,	not	
your	political	preferences,	not	your	personal	preferences.	But	we	do	
know	that	not	every	case	is	decided	9‐0,	and	that	is	not	because	any‐
body	is	acting	in	bad	faith.	It	is	because	.	.	.	law	does	require	a	kind	of	
judgment,	a	kind	of	wisdom	and	there	are	frequently	clashes	of	con‐
stitutional	 values	.	.	.	.	 And	 judges	have	 to,	 you	 know,	 listen	 to	 both	
43.	 Confirmation	Hearing,	Alito,	supra	note	6,	at	357	(response	of	 J.	Samuel	A.	Alito	to	Sen.	
Charles	Grassley,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
44.	 See	Confirmation	Hearing,	Roberts,	supra	note	4,	at	177	(response	of	J.	John	G.	Roberts	to
Sen.	Charles	Grassley,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
45.	 See,	e.g.,	Confirmation	Hearing,	Kagan,	supra	note	3,	at	103	(response	of	Elena	Kagan	to	
Sen.	Jon	Kyl,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary);	id.	at	160	(response	of	Elena	Kagan	to	Sen.	John	Cornyn,	
S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
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sides	 and	 cast	 each	 argument	 in	 the	 best	 possible	 light,	 but	 some‐
times	they	are	not	going	to	agree.46	
The	post‐2000	nominees’	insistence	on	neutrality	is,	in	one	sense,	
neither	 surprising	 nor	 novel.	 Supreme	 Court	 nominees	 have	 long	 in‐
sisted	that	 their	 “personal	predilections”	have	no	place	 in	 the	 judicial	
enterprise,47	that	their	job	is	solely	to	enforce	and	apply	the	law,48	and	
that	they	would	not	approach	the	judicial	enterprise	with	any	particu‐
lar	 agenda	 or	 set	 of	 biases.49	 Indeed,	 such	 assurances	 are	 not	 only	
commonplace,	but	also	appropriate.	We	legitimately	expect	our	justic‐
es	 to	 approach	 cases	 dispassionately,	 with	 open	minds,	 and	 without	
bias	towards	or	against	any	parties.	Nonetheless,	the	ubiquity	of	these	
claims	 in	 the	 post‐2000	 hearings,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	
reaching	objectively	correct	conclusions	in	difficult	cases,	and	the	lack	
of	much	countervailing	discussion	of	the	role	of	judgment	or	subjectivi‐
ty	are	striking.	
II. MINING	THE	TESTIMONY	OF	THE	NOMINEES
A.	Methodology	
Is	 this	 emphasis	 on	 neutrality	 or	 objectivity	 new,	 or	 at	 least	
heightened,	 relative	 to	 historical	 experience?50	 Under	 what	 circum‐
46.	 Id.	at	203	(response	of	Elena	Kagan	to	Sen.	Amy	Klobuchar,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
47.	 See,	e.g.,	Nomination	of	 John	Marshall	Harlan,	of	New	York,	 to	be	Associate	 Justice	of	 the
Supreme	Court	of	 the	United	States	Before	 the	S.	Comm.	on	 the	 Judiciary,	 84th	Cong.	141	 (1955)	
(response	of	J.	John	Marshall	Harlan	to	Sen.	James	O.	Eastland,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
48.	 See,	e.g.,	Nomination	of	Arthur	J.	Goldberg,	of	Illinois,	to	be	Associate	Justice	of	the	Supreme
Court	of	the	United	States	Before	the	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary,	87th	Cong.	8	(1962)	(response	of	J.	
Arthur	J.	Goldberg	to	Sen.	John	J.	McClellan,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
49.	 See,	e.g.,	Nomination	of	Anthony	M.	Kennedy	to	be	Associate	Justice	of	the	Supreme	Court	of
the	United	 States	Before	 the	 S.	 Comm.	 on	 the	 Judiciary,	 100th	 Cong.	 139	 (1987)	 (response	 of	 J.	
Anthony	M.	Kennedy	to	Sen.	Charles	Grassley,	S.	Comm.	on	the	Judiciary).	
50. There	are	reasons	 to	 think	 that	 recent	hearings	might	be	different	 from	older	ones.	As
Geoffrey	Stone	has	pointed	out,	between	1994	and	2005–the	“longest	period	in	American	history	
without	a	Supreme	Court	nomination”–	the	dynamics	of	the	nomination	process	changed.	Stone,	
supra	note	2,	at	447.	Stone	demonstrates	that	in	the	four	most	recent	nominations,	the	number	of	
negative	votes	per	nominee	has	increased	significantly	over	prior	comparable	nominations,	even	
as	the	relative	perceived	ideological	intensity	of	the	recent	nominees	is	relatively	low.	Id.	at	446‐
47,	453‐54.	Stone	proposes	several	possible	and	mutually	reinforcing	explanations:	(1)	Between	
1968	and	1993,	there	were	12	successive	Republican	nominations	and	the	Court	became	signifi‐
cantly	 more	 conservative.	 “So	 dramatic	 a	 change	 in	 the	 Court’s	 ideology	.	.	.	 would	 naturally	
heighten	the	attentiveness	of	senators	to	the	potential	changes	in	the	membership	of	the	Court.”	
Id.	at	447‐48.	(2)	Bush	v.	Gore,	decided	in	2000,	“undoubtedly	highlighted	the	ideological	inclina‐
tions	 of	 the	 Justices	 in	 both	 the	 public	 and	 political	 consciousness.”	 Id.	 at	 448.	 (3)	 Television,	
internet,	and	other	saturated	media	coverage	brings	all	of	the	details	of	confirmation	hearings	and	
nomination	 politics	 to	 the	 American	 people.	 Id.	 at	 449.	 (4)	 Interest	 group	 involvement	 in	 the	
confirmation	process	has	become	“increasingly	aggressive.”	Id.	at	450.	(5)	American	politics	have	
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stances	do	nominees	make	such	claims	and	under	what	circumstances	
do	 they	 acknowledge	 a	 legitimate	 role	 for	 what	 Justice	 Kagan	 called	
“judgment?”	To	 investigate	 these	questions,	 I	 recruited	a	 team	of	 law	
students	 to	 code	 the	 colloquies	 between	 senators	 and	 nominees	 at	
confirmation	hearings.51	The	law	students	were	instructed	to	code	by	
senator	and	by	“round”	of	questioning.52	
Within	each	round,	law	students	were	instructed	to	identify,	inter	
alia,	 whether	 the	 nominee	 made	 claims	 that	 judging	 is	 a	 neutral	 or	
objective	enterprise	and	whether	he	or	she	acknowledged	the	inevita‐
ble	role	of	subjectivity.53	I	did	not	attempt	to	distinguish	between	dif‐
ferent	types	of	claims	of	neutrality.	In	other	words,	a	claim	that	a	judge	
should	not	allow	his	or	her	“personal	predilections”	 to	dictate	 the	re‐
sults	in	cases	counted	as	a	claim	of	neutrality	as	much	as	Chief	Justice	
Roberts’	 umpire	 claims.	 Thus,	 not	 all	 claims	 of	 neutrality	 should	 be	
assumed	to	be	claims	of	objectivity,	and	the	results	here	should	be	un‐
derstood	in	that	light.	
Once	consolidated,	I	had	a	database	of	613	rounds	of	questioning	
covering	 all	 30	 hearings	 from	1955	 through	 2010.54	 For	 purposes	 of	
this	 Article,	 I	 collapsed	 the	 data	 still	 further,	 looking	 at	 each	 unique	
senator‐nominee	pair,	of	which	there	were	332.	As	between	the	pairs,	I	
wanted	 to	 determine	 under	 what	 circumstances	 it	 was	 likely	 that	 a	
nominee	 would	 claim	 neutrality	 or	 objectivity	 in	 judging	 and	 under	
become	increasingly	polarized.	Id.	at	452	(citing	Richard	H.	Pildes,	Why	the	Center	Does	Not	Hold:	
The	Causes	of	Hyperpolarization	in	American	Democracy,	98	CAL.	L.	REV.	273,	277	(2010)).		
51. I	 did	not	 ask	 the	 students	 to	 code	 Senators’	 or	 nominees’	 opening	 statements,	written	
testimony	submitted	by	the	nominees	in	answer	to	written	questions,	or	testimony,	whether	live	
or	written,	by	third	parties.	Nor	did	I	have	them	code	the	portion	of	Clarence	Thomas’s	hearing	in	
which	he	addressed	Anita	Hill’s	allegations.	In	this	last	regard,	I	follow	Ringhand	&	Collins,	supra	
note	 20,	 at	 594‐95,	 and	 Frank	Guliuzza	 III,	 et.	 al.,	The	Senate	 Judiciary	Committee	and	Supreme	
Court	Nominees:	Measuring	the	Dynamics	of	Confirmation	Criteria,	56	J.	OF	POL.	773,	776	(1994).	
52.	 In	contemporary	Supreme	Court	nomination	hearings,	each	Senator	gets	a	turn	at	asking
questions	for	a	set	period	of	time	(generally	30	minutes).	After	each	Senator	has	asked	his	or	her	
questions,	they	start	over	again.		
53. I	did	not	share	my	hypotheses	with	the	law	students.	I	gave	one	student	a	(nearly)	ran‐
dom	 sample	 of	 rounds	 from	 other	 students’	 assignments	 for	 purposes	 of	 trying	 to	 establish	 a	
reliability	baseline.	(The	sample	was	not	quite	random	because	it	was	drawn	from	a	dataset	that	
had	 one	 omission,	 as	well	 as	 some	mis‐numbering,	which	 resulted	 in	 an	 overrepresentation	 of	
Roberts’	rounds.	The	sample	was	drawn	using	Stata12.)	For	identifying	when	nominees	claimed	
neutrality,	 agreement	 between	 coders	was	 60.10%,	with	 a	 Kappa	 of	 .25.	 For	 identifying	when	
nominees	admitted	to	 judgment	or	subjectivity,	agreement	between	coders	was	73.91%,	with	a	
Kappa	of	 .44.	Although	the	reliability	scores	are	lower	than	ideal,	 I	have	no	reason	to	think	that	
there	is	any	systematic	disparity	in	the	coding	that	would	affect	the	results.	
54.	 Two	 justices	had	two	hearings–Abe	Fortas	and	William	Rehnquist–both	of	whom	were
associate	justices	when	they	were	nominated	to	the	position	of	Chief	Justice.	Chief	Justice	Roberts	
was	originally	nominated	to	replace	the	retiring	Associate	Justice	Sandra	Day	O’Connor.	After	his	
hearings	were	held,	Chief	Justice	Rehnquist	died	and	President	Bush	re‐nominated	Roberts	to	be	
Chief	Justice.	No	new	hearings	were	held.		
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what	circumstances	it	was	likely	that	the	nominee	would	acknowledge	
that	 subjectivity	 inevitably–and	perhaps	 even	desirably–has	 a	 role	 in	
judging.	
I	 began	 by	 considering	whether	 there	were	 differences	 between	
Democratic	and	Republican	nominees.	Simple	t‐tests55	established	that	
Democratic	 nominees	 are	 nearly	 twice	 as	 likely	 (.41)	 to	mention	 the	
role	of	judgment	or	subjectivity	in	colloquy	with	any	particular	Senator	
than	are	Republican	nominees	(.23).56	On	the	other	hand,	I	did	not	find	
statistically	 significant	 differences	 between	 Democratic	 and	 Republi‐
can	nominees’	 likelihood	of	 describing	 the	 judicial	 role	 as	 neutral.	 In	
fact	those	rates	were	virtually	identical.57	
To	investigate	the	data	further,	I	ran	probit	regressions58	to	try	to	
identify	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 we	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 see	
claims	of	neutrality	or	admissions	of	subjectivity.59	In	addition	to	con‐
sidering	 the	 party	 of	 the	 nominating	 president,	 I	 considered	 the	per‐
ceived	 ideology	 of	 the	 nominee	 at	 the	 time.60	 I	 also	 thought	 that	 the	
party	 of	 the	 senator	 asking	 the	 questions	 might	 matter,	 as	 well	 as	
whether	 that	 senator	 was	 of	 the	 opposing	 party	 to	 the	 president.61	
Likewise,	 it	 seemed	 to	 me	 that	 with	 respect	 to	 any	 given	 sena‐
tor/nominee	pair,	 a	nominee	was	more	 likely	 to	make	claims	of	neu‐
trality/objectivity	 if	 he	 or	 she	 also	 admitted	 to	 a	 role	 for	 subjectivity	
55.	 All	statistical	analysis	in	this	paper	was	performed	using	Stata12.	
56. The	95%	confidence	interval	for	the	Democratic	nominees	was	.31‐.50	and	for	Republi‐
can	nominees,	it	was	.18‐.29.	(For	these	numbers,	as	well	as	those	in	the	text,	I	have	rounded	to	
two	decimal	points.)	
57.	 Republican	nominees	claimed	neutrality	in	colloquy	with	any	particular	senator	at	a	rate
of	.59,	with	a	95%	confidence	interval	of	.53‐.66.	The	rate	for	Democratic	nominees	was	.62,	with	
a	95%	confidence	interval	of	.53‐.72.	
58.	 	I	clustered	the	results	on	nominee.
59.	 	I	make	no	claims	of	causation	based	on	these	regressions.	 I	use	the	results	to	describe
when	we	might	find	certain	types	of	claims	made	during	the	hearings,	not	to	establish	why.	
60.	 To	account	 for	perceived	 ideology	of	 the	nominees,	 I	 used	 the	Segal‐Cover	 scores.	The
Segal‐Cover	score	codes	 the	perceived	 liberalism	of	each	nominee	at	 the	 time	of	nomination	by	
evaluating	 statements	 made	 about	 them	 in	 major	 newspaper	 editorials.	 See	 Jeffrey	 A.	 Segal	 &	
Albert	D.	Cover,	Ideological	Values	and	the	Votes	of	U.S.	Supreme	Court	Justices,	83	AM.	POL.	SCI.	REV.	
557,	559	(1989);	Segal‐Cover	and	Martin‐Quinn	Measures	Codebook,	THE	SUPREME	COURT	DATABASE	
(Dec.	12,	2012),	available	at		
http://scdb.wustl.edu/_dataSupplements/SegalCoverMartinQuinn_Codebook_120512.pdf.		
61.	 I	also	considered	two	interrelated	measures	of	the	ideology	of	the	Senator	(both	the	first
and	second	dimensions	of	 the	DW‐NOMINATE	scores).	See	Royce	Carroll,	 et	 al.,	DW‐NOMINATE	
Scores	 with	 Bootstrapped	 Standard	 Errors,	 (February	 3,	 2011),	
http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm.	 Because	 the	 early	 hearings	 were	 dominated	 by	 Southern	
Democrat	segregationists	and	because	the	second	dimension	of	the	DW‐NOMINATE	scores	focus‐
es	on	matters	of	civil	 rights	and	equality	as	opposed	to	“government	 intervention	 in	 the	econo‐
my.	.	.	,”	id.,	I	thought	they	might	give	different	results	than	party	of	the	senator.	I	did	not	find	any	
statistically	significant	effect	in	using	these	scores,	however.	
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(and	 vice	 versa).	 In	 other	words,	 those	 two	 types	 of	 claims	might	 go	
hand‐in‐hand	 as	 nominees	 attempt	 to	 explain	 the	 delicate	 balance	 of	
discretion	 and	 constraint	 that	makes	 up	 the	 judicial	 task.	 Finally,	 be‐
cause	the	number	of	rounds	of	questioning	and	the	numbers	of	sena‐
tors	asking	questions	vary	significantly	from	nominee	to	nominee	but	
have	overall	 increased	steadily	over	 time,	 I	 ran	 the	 regressions	 sepa‐
rately	using	two	different	variables:	(1)	the	number	of	rounds	of	ques‐
tioning	 per	 senator/nominee	 pair,	 reasoning	 that	 as	 hearings	 get	
longer,	 there	are	more	opportunities	 for	nominees	 to	 say	all	 kinds	of	
things,	and	(2)	time.62	And	another	time‐related	measure,	I	calculated	
how	 close	 each	 hearing	 was	 to	 the	 next	 presidential	 election,	 as	 it	
seemed	 plausible	 that	 hearings	 become	 more	 ideologically	 charged–
probably	leading	to	more	claims	of	neutrality–the	closer	they	occur	to	
an	election.	63	
B.	Results	
The	 results	 of	 the	 probit	 regressions	 showed	 that	 a	 nominee	 is	
more	likely	to	assert	claims	of	neutrality	or	objectivity:	
(a)	 the	more	recent	the	hearing	(or	the	more	rounds	of	questioning	
in	the	hearing);	
(b)	 when	the	Senator	is	a	Republican;	
(c)	 when	the	Senator	is	a	member	of	the	party	in	opposition	to	the	
President;	and	
(d)	 when	 the	 nominee	 also	 acknowledges	 a	 role	 for	 judg‐
ment/subjectivity	in	colloquy	with	the	same	Senator.	
I	 found	 that	 a	 nominee	 is	more	 likely	 to	 acknowledge	 a	 role	 for	
judgment	and	subjectivity	when:	
(a)	 the	more	liberal	the	nominee	appeared	to	be	at	the	time64;	
(b)	 the	more	recent	the	hearing	(or	the	more	rounds	of	questioning	
in	 the	 hearing)	 but	 if	 the	 hearing	 took	 place	 after	 2000,	 the	 likeli‐
hood	of	such	acknowledgement	was	reduced;	and	
62.	 Each	proved	statistically	significant	when	alone	in	the	regression;	when	both	were	pre‐
sent,	neither	was.	
63.	 See	 Stone,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 386‐87	 (discussing	 conservative	 Republican	 and	 southern
Democratic	opposition	to	Fortas’	nomination	to	Chief	 Justice)	(“[T]he	coalition	.	.	.	had	an	 incen‐
tive	 to	 block	 Johnson’s	.	.	.	 nomination	.	.	.	 less	 than	 five	 months	 before	 the	 1968	 presidential	
election,	 which	 the	 Republicans	 fully	 expected	 to	 win.”);	 id.	 at	 414	 n.56	 (noting	 that	 “in	 all	 of	
American	 history,	 presidents	 have	 made	 only	 eight	 Supreme	 Court	 nominations	 within	 six	
months	of	a	presidential	election”).		
64. 	This	 finding	 should	 be	 interpreted	 with	 some	 caution	 due	 to	 possible	 endogeneity.
Because	 the	Segal‐Cover	 scores	 rely	on	newspaper	 editorial	descriptions	of	 the	nominee,	 those	
editorials	 could	 themselves	 be	 responding	 to	 things	 the	 nominee	 said	 during	 the	 confirmation	
hearings.	Interestingly,	the	party	of	the	nominating	president	was	not	statistically	significant.	
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(c)	 the	nominee	makes	claims	of	neutrality	or	objectivity	 in	 collo‐
quy	with	the	same	Senator.65	
All	of	 these	results	are	significant	at	p>.05.	Proximity	 to	 the	next	
presidential	election	was	not	statistically	significant.	
III. 	IMPLICATIONS	AND	FUTURE	RESEARCH
These	 results	 are	 suggestive	 in	 many	 ways	 and	 raise	 numerous	
questions.	Perhaps	of	most	interest,	however,	is	the	fact	that	claims	of	
objectivity	or	neutrality	do	 in	 fact	appear	to	be	 increasingly	 likely	as‐
pects	 of	 confirmation	 hearings	 over	 time.	Moreover,	 such	 claims	 are	
particularly	 likely	when	 the	nominee	 is	 speaking	 to	 a	member	of	 the	
opposing	 party.	 In	 our	 currently	 highly	 polarized	 political	 environ‐
ment,66	 it	 is	hardly	surprising	 that	nominees	are	more	 likely	 to	claim	
neutrality	or	objectivity	in	their	confirmation	hearings	in	order	to	not	
become	 targets	 of	 the	 opposing	 party;	 nor	 is	 it	 surprising	 that	 such	
claims	are	more	likely	the	more	recent	the	hearing.	Indeed,	at	least	for	
a	nominee	facing	an	opposition‐led	Senate	or	an	opposition‐led	filibus‐
ter,67	 a	 real	 possibility	 in	 our	 current	 political	 environment,	 it	might	
well	be	impossible	to	get	confirmed	without	making	such	claims.	
Ironically,	however,	while	these	unsurprising	efforts	by	nominees	
to	claim	neutrality	may	help	them	get	confirmed,	in	the	long	run	they	
might	 have	 deleterious	 effects	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court’s	 standing	 and	
legitimacy.	 Recent	 research,	 including	 some	 in	 this	 very	 volume,	
demonstrates	that	 legitimacy	is	often	enhanced	when	decisionmakers	
acknowledge	that	they	are	deciding	difficult	questions	and	make	clear	
that	they	have	taken	account	of	different	perspectives.	Supreme	Court	
nominees,	however,	sometimes	 imply	that	 judges	do	the	opposite:	 in‐
stead	 of	weighing	 different	 perspectives,	 they	 rely	 on	 legal	materials	
and	 deductive	 logic	 to	 reach	 the	 objectively	 correct	 answer.	 These	
claims,	rather	than	enhance	legitimacy,	may	exacerbate	alienation	and	
disappointment	 among	 those	unhappy	with	decisions	of	 the	Court	 or	
with	the	votes	of	individual	justices.	
To	explain	why	requires	some	discussion	of	what	several	theorists	
and	 empirical	 scholars	 call	 “cultural	 cognition.”68	 Cultural	 cognition	
65.	 	The	other	results	were	the	same	regardless	of	whether	this	factor	was	included.	
66.	 See,	e.g.,	Pildes,	supra	note	50,	at	273.	
67.	 See	Stone,	supra	note	2,	at	385‐86	(discussing	circumstances	under	which	the	Senate	has
failed	to	confirm	a	nominee,	including	the	Republican‐led	filibuster	of	Abe	Fortas’s	nomination	for	
Chief	Justice).	
68.	 See,	e.g.,	Dan	Kahan,	David	A.	Hoffman	&	Donald	Braman,	Whose	Eyes	Are	You	Going	to
Believe?:	Scott	v.	Harris	and	the	Perils	of	Cognitive	Illiberalism,	122	HARV.	L.	REV.	837	(2009)	(here‐
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influences	the	way	people	evaluate	empirical	evidence	in	legally	salient	
situations.	 More	 specifically,	 it	 is	 a	 form	 of	 motivated	 reasoning	
through	which	 individuals’	group	affiliations	and	social	 commitments	
color	the	conclusions	they	draw	from	empirical	evidence.69	For	exam‐
ple,	when	asked	 to	determine	whether	a	videotaped	protest	 involved	
constitutionally	protected	speech	or	crossed	the	line	into	unprotected	
conduct,	 individuals’	 responses	 varied	predictably	 and	 systematically	
based	on	those	values	and	affiliations	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	the	oth‐
er	 hand,	 whether	 they	 were	 told	 that	 the	 protest	 involved	 abortion	
protesters	outside	a	clinic	or	gay	rights	protesters	objecting	 to	 “don’t	
ask	don’t	 tell”	 outside	 a	 college	placement	 facility	where	 the	military	
was	interviewing	students.70	People’s	perceptions	of	the	protests	were	
often	tied	to	their	sympathies	for	or	against	the	protesters.	
Not	 only	 do	people’s	 perceptions	 and	 evaluations	 of	 events	 vary	
with	their	worldviews	and	group	affiliations,	but	people	are	very	good	
at	recognizing	this	trait	 in	those	with	different	worldviews	while	gen‐
erally	being	oblivious	to	it	in	themselves	and	those	they	tend	to	agree	
with.	 This	 phenomenon	 is	 called	 “naïve	 realism”	 because	 people	 are	
realistic	when	it	comes	to	the	way	others’	thoughts	and	conclusions	are	
influenced	 by	 their	 values	 and	 commitments,	 but	 naïve	 about	 them‐
selves.71	As	a	 result,	people	believe	 that	 they	 themselves	are	 fair	and	
neutral,	but	they	often	fail	to	credit	the	good	faith	of	those	with	whom	
they	disagree.72	This	feature	of	cultural	cognition	can	cause	or	exacer‐
bate	 social	 division	 as	 people	 on	 either	 side	 of	 an	 issue	 believe	 that	
their	 opponents	 (and	 only	 their	 opponents)	 are	 acting	 out	 of	 illegiti‐
mate	partisanship.73	
In	his	recent	Harvard	Law	Review	Foreword,	Dan	Kahan	explores	
the	 way	 that	 cultural	 cognition	might	 shape	 public	 responses	 to	 Su‐
preme	Court	decisions.74	As	in	other	arenas,	he	says,	people	are	likely	
inafter,	Kahan,	et	al.,	Whose	Eyes);	Dan	Kahan,	et	al.,	 “They	Saw	a	Protest”:	Cognitive	 Illiberalism	
and	the	Speech‐Conduct	Distinction,	64	STAN.	L.	REV.	851	(2012)	(hereinafter,	Kahan,	et	al.,	Protest).	
69.	 Kahan,	et	al.,	Protest,	supra	note	68,	at	853,	859.	
70.	 Id.	at	863‐64,	869‐73	(explaining	the	experimental	conditions);	id.	at	877‐80	(explaining
the	results).	The	video	actually	depicted	a	protest	by	the	Westboro	Baptist	Church	and	a	counter‐
protest,	 but	 in	 the	video	 they	 looked	 like	 a	 single	protest.	 Id.	 at	 18‐19.	The	words	on	all	 of	 the	
signs	were	blurred	so	that	the	study	participants	could	not	read	them,	and	a	generic	sound	track	
was	added.	Id.	at	872.	
71.	 Id.	at	860.	
72.	 Dan	M.	 Kahan,	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 2010	Term–Foreword:	Neutral	 Principles,	Motivated
Cognition,	and	Some	Problems	for	Constitutional	Law,	125	HARV.	L.	REV.	1,	21‐22	(2011)	(hereinaf‐
ter	Kahan,	Foreword).	
73.	 Id.	at	61.	
74.	 Id.
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to	believe	that	the	justices	with	whom	they	agree	are	reaching	careful‐
ly	considered	results,	while	those	with	whom	they	disagree	are	allow‐
ing	their	ideological	views	to	inappropriately	dictate	their	conclusions.	
Particularly	because	the	Supreme	Court	often	decides	cases	on	contro‐
versial	 and	 high‐profile	 issues–abortion	 or	 affirmative	 action,	 for	 ex‐
ample–these	 reactions	 carry	 with	 them	 the	 threat	 of	 de‐legitimizing	
the	Court	in	the	public’s	eyes	because	it	(or	at	least	those	justices	with	
whom	the	citizen	disagrees)	 is	acting	 ideologically,	not	based	on	 law.	
And	such	views	of	the	Court	are	not	uncommon.	In	a	poll	taken	before	
the	Court	announced	its	ruling	upholding	the	Affordable	Care	Act,75	for	
example,	 “a	majority	 of	 respondents	 expressed	 concern	 that	 ‘the	 Su‐
preme	Court	makes	decisions	based	on	a	political	agenda	instead	of	the	
law,’	with	only	eleven	percent	of	respondents	expressing	‘a	great	deal	
of	 confidence	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 puts	 politics	 aside	 and	makes	
decisions	 based	 on	 the	 law.’”76	 This	 view	 is	 not	 conducive	 to	 public	
support	and	respect	for	life‐tenured,	unelected	justices	or	for	the	Court	
on	which	they	sit.	
Intriguingly	 and	 counter‐intuitively,	 Kahan	 argues	 that	 the	 neu‐
tral,	 authoritative	 voice	 of	 the	 classic	 judicial	 opinion	 itself	may	 con‐
tribute	to	public	perception	that	the	Court	is	deciding	cases	“based	on	a	
political	agenda	 instead	of	 law”77	or	that	the	 justices	are	“fitting	their	
rulings	 to	 their	partisan	views.”78	When	people	disagree	with	an	out‐
come,	 that	neutral	 voice,	 rather	 than	 assuring	 them	 that	 the	 result	 is	
objectively	 correct,	 instead	 can	 contribute	 to	 a	 perception	 that	 the	
Court	 considered	only	one	 side	and	 that	other	perspectives	were	not	
even	considered.79	
As	 a	 result,	 Kahan	 argues,	 the	 justices	would	 do	 better	 to	write	
opinions	 that	 explicitly	 acknowledge	 the	 complexity	 and	 value‐laden	
nature	of	many	of	the	decisions	they	must	make	and	that	acknowledge	
that	 law	and	legal	reasoning	alone	may	not	provide	a	path	to	a	single	
“right”	 answer.80	 Explicit	 judicial	 recognition	 of	 the	 inherently	 inde‐
terminate	 nature	 of	 many	 of	 the	 issues	 confronted	 by	 the	 Court—a	
75.	 	Nat’l	Fed’n	of	Indep.	Bus.	v.	Sebelius,	132	S.	Ct.	2566	(2012).	
76.	 	Karlan,	 supra	 note	 15,	 at	 7	 n.34	 (quoting	 Memorandum	 from	 Geoff	 Garin	 et	 al.,	 Hart	
Research	Assocs.,	 to	Alliance	 for	 Justice,	Views	of	 the	Supreme	Court	on	Eve	of	 the	Health	Care	
Ruling	(June	11,	2012),	available	at	http://www.afj.org/connect‐with‐the‐issues/supreme‐court‐
ethics‐reform/hart‐afj‐scotus‐attitudes.pdf).	
77.	 	Id.	
78.	 	Kahan,	Foreword,	supra	note	72,	at	28.	
79.	 	Id.	at	28‐29.	
80.	 	Id.	at	62.
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kind	 of	 complexity	 that	 Kahan	 calls	 aporia81—would	 not	 of	 course	
erase	social	divisions	and	disagreements.	But	such	recognition	might,	
he	argues,	allow	those	on	the	losing	side	to	feel	that	their	position	was	
considered—and	it	might	therefore	actually	 increase	 the	Court’s	 legit‐
imacy	with	the	citizenry.82	
As	 other	 members	 of	 the	 Symposium	 have	 illustrated,	 experi‐
ments	 on	 people’s	 reactions	 to	 hypothetical	 judicial	 decisions	 they	
disagree	with	provide	empirical	support	for	Kahan’s	theory.	Tom	Tyler	
and	Margaret	 Krochik	 find	 that	 individuals	 are	more	 likely	 to	 accept	
policy	outcomes	they	disagree	with	when	they	believe,	 inter	alia,	that	
their	 concerns	 or	 values	 have	 been	 given	 due	 consideration.83	 Dan	
Simon	and	Nicholas	Scurich	likewise	find	that	among	people	who	disa‐
gree	 with	 the	 outcome	 in	 hypothetical	 judicial	 decisions,	 “decisions	
accompanied	by	monolithic	reasoning	received	lower	evaluations	than	
decisions	that	provided	good	reasons	for	both	sides	of	the	dispute.	 In	
other	 words,	 lay	 participants	 seem	 to	 prefer	 decisions	 that	 admit	 to	
complexity	and	open‐endedness	of	the	legal	 issue	over	ones	that	only	
acknowledge	the	strength	of	the	winning	side.”84	In	other	words,	peo‐
ple	seem	to	respond	better	to	unfavorable	decisions	that	acknowledge	
aporia	than	to	unfavorable	decisions	that	seem	to	insist	that	the	result	
was	the	only	one	possible.	
All	of	this	may	have	implications	for	Supreme	Court	confirmation	
hearings	and	the	way	they	are	conducted.	Just	as	the	“neutral”	judicial	
voice	may	 trigger	naïve	realism	and	 its	consequent	social	division,	 so	
too	 might	 confirmation	 hearings’	 repeated	 invocations	 of	 neutrality	
and	disavowals	 of	 ideology	or	 subjectivity	 in	 judging.	The	disconnect	
between	these	claims	and	the	reality	of	what	people	observe	once	de‐
cisions	are	made	might	worsen	what	Kahan	calls	the	Court’s	“neutrali‐
ty	 crisis.”85	 And	 recent	 hearings	 may	 increase	 this	 danger.	 Although	
claims	of	neutrality	have	become	more	 likely	 to	occur	 in	colloquy	be‐
tween	particular	senators	and	judicial	nominees,	admissions	of	subjec‐
tivity	may	not	have,	since	2000,	followed	the	same	path.	
81.	 	Id.	at	62‐63.	
82.	 Id.	at	63.	
83.	 Tom	Tyler	and	Margaret	Krochik,	Deference	to	Authority	as	a	Basis	for	Managing	Ideoligi‐
cal	Conflict,	88	CHI.‐KENT	L.	REV.	433,	449	(2013).	
84.	 Dan	 Simon	 and	 Nicholas	 Scurich,	 Judicial	 Overstating,	 88	 CHI.‐KENT	 L.	 REV.	 411,	 429
(2013).	
85.	 Kahan	uses	 the	 term	 throughout	his	Harvard	Law	Review	Foreword.	Kahan,	Foreword,
supra	note	72.	(Whether	the	Court	currently	faces	a	“crisis”	is	of	course	debatable,	but	the	condi‐
tions	that	Kahan	argues	may	cause	such	a	crisis	are	indeed	present.)		
 	 	  	
2013]	 SUPREME	COURT	CONFIRMATION	HEARINGS	 473	
To	be	clear,	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	that	any	particular	statement	
in	 a	 confirmation	hearing	 or	 even	 any	particular	 hearing	have	 led	 or	
will	 lead	 to	 a	 “neutrality	 crisis.”	 Any	 effect	 that	 confirmation	hearing	
rhetoric	might	have	on	public	views	of	the	Court	is	greatly	attenuated.	
Nonetheless,	 confirmation	 hearings	 are	 virtually	 the	 only	 time	 that	
ordinary	people	are	likely	to	pay	much	attention	to	the	way	judges	and	
justices	 describe	 their	 work	 and	 the	 work	 of	 the	 court,	 whether	 by	
watching	or	listening	to	the	hearings	themselves	or	by	following	media	
accounts.	In	fact,	surprising	numbers	of	people	apparently	do	so.86	The	
hearings	 thus	 can	 have	 a	 significant	 educative	 function.87	 Moreover,	
the	 rhetoric	 and	 themes	 of	 the	 hearings	 likely	 work	 their	 way	 into	
mainstream	 discussions	 of	 the	 Court	 and	 its	 work.	 Future	 research	
might	well	 investigate	 this	 aspect	 of	media	 coverage	 of	 confirmation	
hearings.	
Subject	 to	 this	 caveat,	my	 finding	 that	Democratic	 nominees	 are	
about	 twice	 as	 likely	 to	make	admissions	of	 subjectivity	 than	are	Re‐
publican	 nominees	 gives	 rise	 to	 an	 additional,	 related	 concern.	 How	
might	these	differences	in	the	way	nominees	of	different	parties	have	
described	the	role	of	judges	affect	the	way	that	people	of	different	po‐
litical	 orientations	 themselves	 think	 about	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Court	 and,	
ultimately,	to	the	Court’s	own	legitimacy?	As	Tyler	and	Simon/Scurich	
suggest,	 admissions	 of	 aporia	might	 increase	 people’s	 acceptance	 of	
decisions	they	disagree	with.	But	for	those	who	tend	to	agree	with	Re‐
publican	nominees,	does	the	same	dynamic	operate	when	the	authori‐
ties	 on	 “their	 side”	 do	 not	 reinforce	 those	 admissions?	 Likewise,	 for	
those	 sympathetic	 to	 Democratic	 nominees,	 if	 the	 authorities	 they	
agree	 with	 admit	 to	 subjectivity	 but	 the	 other	 side	 does	 not,	 is	 that	
likely	 to	 heighten	 a	 belief	 that	 those	 on	 the	 other	 side	 acting	 in	 bad	
faith?	That	nominees	are	more	likely	to	make	their	claims	of	neutrality	
when	 talking	 to	 senators	 of	 the	 opposing	 party	 heighten	 any	 effect?	
More	research	is	needed	to	tease	out	some	of	these	dynamics.	
The	wealth	of	data	provided	by	coding	the	confirmation	hearings	
also	 provides	 the	 opportunity	 to	 investigate	 the	 role	 of	 a	 variety	 of	
additional	 variables.	 For	 example,	 how	 often	 do	 the	 senators	 them‐
selves	describe	the	judicial	role	as	one	of	total	objectivity	and	how	of‐
ten	do	they	acknowledge	aporia	or	the	need	for	subjective	 judgment?	
Do	discussions	of	the	judicial	role	come	up	more	frequently	in	the	con‐
86.	 	See	Gibson	and	Caldeira,	supra	note	2,	at	71.	
87.	 	See	 Stone,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 466	 (arguing	 that	 the	 educative	 function	 of	 the	 hearings
should	be	“paramount”).	
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text	of	particular	areas	of	law	or	controversial	legal	issues,	such	as	the	
right	 to	privacy	or	 the	 rights	of	 criminal	defendants,	 or	do	 these	dis‐
cussions	tend	to	occur	in	the	abstract?	Does	the	increasing	polarization	
of	our	political	 culture	have	consequences	 for	 the	ways	 that	 senators	
and	 nominees	 alike	 discuss	 the	 judicial	 role?	 These	 and	 other	 ques‐
tions	provide	rich	terrain	for	future	work.	
CONCLUSION	
In	 this	 paper,	 I	 present	 some	 preliminary	 analysis	 of	 nominees’	
claims	 during	 confirmation	 hearings	 about	 how	 judicial	 decision‐
making	operates.	Virtually	all–appropriately–profess	neutrality,	but	for	
some	that	profession	not	only	 implies	appropriate	neutrality	but	also	
suggests	that	judging	is	primarily	an	objective	process.	For	other	nom‐
inees,	 in	particular	more	 liberal	nominees,	while	 they	 certainly	make	
claims	 of	 neutrality,	 they	 also	 acknowledge	 that	 judging	 in	 fact	 also	
involves	making	judgments,	judgments	that	are	necessarily	subjective.	
These	disparities,	as	well	as	other	features	of	the	confirmation	process,	
coupled	with	 the	 insights	of	cultural	cognition	researchers,	raise	con‐
cerns	about	the	longterm	effect	on	public	attitudes	towards	the	Court,	
particularly	on	people’s	willingness	to	accept	Supreme	Court	decisions	
with	which	they	strongly	disagree.	
